"Helpful laymen in informational cascades," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, August 2015, volume 116, pages 407-415
Abstract: This paper extends Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch’s informational cascade model by introducing two types of players: experts with high signal accuracy and laymen with low signal accuracy. If a small enough fraction of laymen are present in the population, the probability of having a correct cascade is strictly higher than if no laymen are present. This is because the presence of laymen makes experts less eager to follow suit, which increases the amount of private information revealed.
"Non-competing persuaders," November 2018
Abstract: I study Bayesian persuasion games with multiple persuaders in which the persuaders are non-competing: all persuaders want the decision maker to take the same action, regardless of the state. In the case of a single persuader, it is known from previous research that the persuader-optimal information design leaves the decision maker with no surplus. In this paper, I show that with two or more non-competing persuaders and independent tests, there are always equilibria in which the decision maker receives surplus. Moreover, if there is exogenous noise then the decision maker receives surplus in every equilibrium, provided the number of persuaders is sufficiently large.
Abstract: When advancements in data analytics enable media to provide personalized news for the readers, will they provide news that conforms to the readers' existing biases, thus creating “echo chambers”? Contrary to popular belief and theories of traditional media, this paper shows that the answer is “no”. It is, in fact, optimal for click-maximizing websites to provide news that are always opposite to a reader's prior bias.